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This paper investigates the role of the probability of informed trading (PIN) in mergers 
and acquisitions. We show that acquirers with higher PINs use more cash to finance 
their deals due to their higher cost of equity, and acquirers use more equity financing 
when acquiring targets with higher PINs to share the information risk with the target 
shareholders. We also find that acquirers and targets with higher PINs both experience 
higher announcement returns when cash financing is used indicating that PINs are 
priced in the M&A market.  
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There is an extensive literature that investigates the role of information 
asymmetry in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These studies typically focus on the 
role of target and bidder firms’ private information about their own values and the 
influence of this asymmetric information on various M&A outcomes. For example, 
Hansen (1987) suggests that acquirers are more likely to use stock to acquire targets 
with higher information asymmetry to share the information risk with target 
shareholders, while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) find that acquirers with 
higher information asymmetry experience lower announcement returns when using 
stock financing due to the adverse selection problem documented by Myers and Maljuf 
(1984). These findings are related to information asymmetry that is intrinsic to the firm 
and arises because managers of the acquirers and targets possess better information than 
the counterparty. 
In this study, we examine the role of the probability of informed trading (PIN) in 
M&As. The notion of PIN stems from market microstructure research where equity 
investors are viewed as being informed and uninformed. In this respect, informed 
investors profit at the expense of uninformed investors due to their information 
advantage about the firm’s intrinsic value. Uninformed investors thus face information 
asymmetry risk that relies on the frequency and composition of information events and 
the population of informed and uninformed investors.  
Our focus on PIN contrasts to previous M&A research which analyses the role of 
information asymmetry arising from managers’ private information, measured using 
for example analyst forecast bias and dispersion and the quality of financial information. 
PIN differs from these commonly used measures and possesses its advantages in at least 
three aspects. First, the PIN measure is derived from a market microstructure model 
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that analyses the private information from market traders. It has strong theoretical 
foundation and also enables researchers to directly estimate information asymmetry 
using observed trading data. Second, common information asymmetry measures tend 
to have several but sometimes conflictual interpretations, and are often found to 
inadequately proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and other market 
players.1 We show for instance, that PIN has low correlation with various measures of 
information asymmetry, such as tangibility of a firm’s assets, the dispersion of analyst 
forecasts (Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009; Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz, 2007), analyst forecast errors (Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009) and 
earnings quality (McNichols and Stubben, 2015), confirming that PIN captures a 
component of information asymmetry substantially different from other measures. 
Finally, PIN is arguably a superior proxy, even compared to other information 
asymmetry measures based on market microstructure such as various components of 
bid-ask spreads. Bharath et al. (2009) document that PIN is most highly related to a 
composite index of information asymmetry and likely to capture the commonality of 
information asymmetry. 
Our study is motivated by prior research which documents that the probability of 
informed trading plays an important role in asset pricing and corporate policies. For 
example, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) document a positive association 
between PIN and average stock returns, and Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) 
demonstrate PIN affects the cost of capital as uninformed investors require higher 
returns to compensate for the risk of trading in stocks where they face greater 
information risk. Furthermore, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2006) show that PIN affects 
                                                 
1 See Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and Sadka and Scherbina (2007) for the interpretation of analyst 
forecast dispersion, and Dang et al. (2018) for firm size. Frankel and Li (2004) and Huddart and Ke (2007) 
document that analyst coverage, forecast dispersion and institutional ownership cannot capture and 
explain insider trading activity and profits. See section 2.1 for further discussion.  
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the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price, while Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
find a negative relation between a firm’s disclosure quality and PIN due to the reduction 
of the likelihood that investors would be able to discover and trade on private 
information.  
This study applies the notion of PIN, which captures information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed equity investors, to the choice of payment method 
in mergers and acquisitions. We argue that since uninformed equity investors face 
greater information asymmetry, in equilibrium they demand higher returns to hold the 
stock, which increases the cost of equity for the firm. Since the valuation of cash 
payment is less sensitive to private information, it is predicted to be the preferred 
payment method choice for bidders with higher PINs. On the other hand, bidders with 
lower PINs are expected to choose stock or a hybrid method of payment. Thus, we 
expect that there exists a “pecking order”, and the choice of payment method is driven 
by a trade-off between the increased cost of equity resulting from PINs and the costs 
and benefits of using cash financing.  
In contrast, the association between PIN of the target firm and the payment 
method is more ambiguous than it is in the case of the acquiring firm, and conflicting 
evidence have been found in prior studies. On the one hand, when acquiring target firms 
with higher PINs, bidders may pay a higher proportion of equity to share the 
information risk with target shareholders (Hansen 1987). On the other hand, bidders 
may use more cash financing as it has the advantage of increasing the success rate of 
the bid and deterring competition from rival bidders since it signals that the bidder has 
a high private valuation for the target firm (Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009).  
We examine the association between target and acquiring firms’ PINs and the 
method of payment using a large sample of US merger and acquisitions. Consistent 
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with our expectations, acquirers with higher PINs use a higher percentage of cash to 
finance their M&A deals. In addition, acquirers use more equity financing when 
acquiring targets with higher PINs, which is in line with Hansen’s (1987) argument that 
acquirers use equity financing to share the information risk with the target shareholders. 
Next, we examine whether PIN is associated with acquirer announcement returns. 
The extant literature suggests that acquisitions are generally at best wealth neutral for 
acquiring firm shareholders, and potentially wealth destroying upon deal announcement 
(Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005). One 
explanation of the negative acquirer announcement returns is that, in the presence of 
information asymmetry, the market considers a share-for-share bid as a signal of 
overvaluation of the bidder’s stock which leads to negative announcement-period 
returns (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987). Consistent with this argument, we 
expect bidders with a higher PIN to experience higher announcement returns in cash 
financed deals, as cash deals are likely to be considered positive signals that the bidder 
firm’s equity is worth more than its market value (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 
2007). This predicts a positive association between bidder PINs and announcement 
returns for cash deals. On the other hand, negative acquirer announcement-period 
returns can be due to a high PIN of the targets, because a high degree of information 
asymmetry in the targets are likely to result in reduced precision in the estimate of target 
firm value and an increased chance of overvaluation. This predicts a negative relation 
between target PINs and bidder announcement returns, especially for cash deals.      
Measuring announcement returns using 5-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) centered on the acquisition announcement date, we find a significant and 
positive association between acquirer PINs and acquirer CARs for cash deals only. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) that 
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cash offers made by bidders with higher information asymmetry are considered a signal 
of undervaluation of the bidder’s equity. In terms of economic magnitudes, we find that, 
for cash deals, a one standard deviation increase in acquirer PIN around the mean 
increases acquirer CAR by 496 basis points. We also find a negative and significant 
relation between target PINs and bidder announcement returns, supporting that bidders 
obtain lower announcement returns when acquiring targets with a high degree of 
information asymmetry. For cash deals, a one standard deviation increase in target PIN 
around the mean reduces acquirer CAR by 319 basis points.  
Lastly, we investigate the relationship between PINs and target announcement 
returns. Prior research consistently documents that average target firm CARs around 
the deal announcement are positive (Dong et al., 2006; Ahern, 2012). One of the well 
documented reasons for the positive target announcement returns is the “winner’s 
curse”, in that the bidder who mostly overestimates the value of the target firm will be 
the winning bidder (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983). As the likelihood of overpaying 
increases with the level of asymmetric information, we hypothesize that target PINs 
increases the likelihood that the bidder overpays for the target. We thus predict a 
positive relation between target PINs and target announcement returns. However, we 
expect the positive relation to be diminished when equity financing is used, as the 
acquirer is likely to have detected the high level of information asymmetry in the target 
firm and hence chooses to share the information risk with target shareholders. 
Consistent with our expectations, our results show that target announcement 
returns are positively associated with target firm PINs, but are negatively related to 
bidder PINs. Similar to bidder announcement returns, the effects of bidder and target 
PINs on target announcement-period returns are of economic significance. When 
testing the relation for cash, mixed and stock deals separately, we find that the 
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significant association between PINs and target CARs is concentrated in cash deals, and 
the association disappears for equity financed deals. This supports the view that targets 
do not benefit when acquirers have a high degree of information asymmetry among 
investors, or when acquirers use equity financing to share the high information risk with 
the target firm shareholders. 
Our results are robust to an alternative measure of PIN developed by Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), an industry-adjusted PIN measure to account for 
potential outliers, the inclusion of commonly used measures of information asymmetry 
for both the acquirer and the target as controls in the regressions, a variety of firm-level 
and deal-specific controls affecting the M&A outcomes, and the possible confounding 
effect of liquidity on PINs (Amihud 2002; Duarte and Young 2009). We analyse 
acquisition offer premium and find that targets with higher PINs tend to have a higher 
takeover premium especially in cash deals. Finally, we examine if the role of PINs in 
M&A depends on a firm’s governance and regulation environments. Our results show 
that, when facing less external disciplining (more anti-takeover provisions), bidders 
with high PINs tend to use less cash financing, but use more cash when acquiring targets 
with high levels of information asymmetry. This is in line with Masulis et al. (2007) 
that the managerial tendency of engaging in value-destroying takeovers increases with 
less disciplining from a firm’s governance mechanism. We also find that, after the 
implementation of Regulation FD in 2000, bidders with high PINs are less likely to use 
cash financing for M&As, but continue to rely on more equity financing when acquiring 
targets with high PINs.   
Our study on the probability of informed trading makes a contribution to both the 
market microstructure and the M&A literature. Prior research highlights the importance 
of PIN on asset prices (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004), 
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capital structure choices (Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2009), investment efficiency 
(Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2006) and disclosure policy (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). 
Our study adds to this strand of research by examining the extent to which the degree 
of PINs of both acquirers and targets affects the choice of payment method, 
announcement-period returns and the offer premium in mergers and acquisitions.  
This study also contributes to the literature on mergers and acquisitions by 
highlighting the importance of PINs. While previous studies focus on information 
asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors (Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2007; Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009), we show that payment 
method choice and announcement returns for the acquirers and targets are also 
dependent on a firm’s external information environment across investor groups, as 
reflected in the probability of information based trading.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and provides 
summary statistics. The main results and additional tests are presented in Section 4 and 
Section 5 respectively, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 PIN and information asymmetry 
The notion of the probability of informed trading stems from the market 
microstructure literature, where investors are viewed as informed or uninformed. 
Although uninformed traders are unaware of the specific information possessed by 
informed traders, they realize that such information influences the trades of informed 
traders, thereby attaching information content to the composition of trades. Thus, an 
imbalance of buy or sell orders leads uninformed investors to update their beliefs and 
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eventually cause market prices to converge to values based on the new information. 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) examine the role of asymmetric information 
across investors and show that PIN is positively associated with average asset returns. 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) further suggest that in equilibrium uninformed traders require 
a higher rate of return when the probability of informed trading is higher, leading to a 
positive association between PINs and returns. Chen et al. (2007) show that PIN is 
positively associated with the sensitivity of firm-level investment to stock prices, 
supporting the view that managers learn from private information that is incorporated 
into stock trades. Ferreira and Laux (2007) document a positive association between 
PIN and strong corporate governance, and interpret the results as evidence that 
enhanced corporate governance leads to private information collection and informed 
trading by market participants.    
Traditionally, the corporate finance literature commonly measures a firm’s degree 
of information asymmetry according to firm characteristics such as its size, growth 
opportunities, or tangibility of its assets. PIN differs from these measures and has its 
unique advantages in several aspects. First and theoretically, the PIN measure is based 
on a structural market microstructural model, where order imbalance increases among 
buy and sell orders with informed trading. It is reasonable to believe that market players 
in close touch with a firm and its business possess better information about the firm and 
trade based on this superior information. Market microstructure research models the 
trading behaviour of market players and analyses the information asymmetry about the 
payoffs of a firm’s securities. In such respect, information asymmetry measures derived 
from market microstructure research such as PIN have strong theoretical foundation, 
which accordingly enable researchers to directly capture the degree of information 
asymmetry using observed trading data, compared to common firm-level measures. 
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Second, common firm-level measures are often found to inadequately proxy for 
the degree of information asymmetry between insiders and other market players. For 
example, Frankel and Li (2004) and Huddart and Ke (2007) show that insider trading 
activity and profits can hardly be explained by analyst coverage, forecast dispersion 
and institutional ownership. In addition, these measures tend to have several, sometimes 
conflictual, interpretations. For instance, analyst forecast dispersion is found to be a 
superior proxy for differences in opinion rather than information asymmetry 
(Pasquariello and Vega 2007; Sadka and Scherbina 2007), while firm size can represent 
a firm’s financial attributes, regulatory status, or organizational complexity (Dang et al. 
2018) that are all substantially distinguished from information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, the PIN measure is grounded on market microstructure models and is instead 
designed to capture financial market participants’ time-varying perception of the 
information advantage held by firm insiders (Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu, 2009). In 
Section 3.4, we show that PIN has a low correlation with common firm-level measures 
of information asymmetry, highlighting the empirical difference between PIN and other 
information asymmetry measures. 
Finally, even compared to other microstructure-based measures of information 
asymmetry such as the components of bid-ask spreads, PIN is arguably a superior proxy. 
For example, bid-ask spreads tend to capture not only adverse selection costs but also 
inventory holding costs. Bharath et al. (2009) compare seven different measures of 
information asymmetry, including the adverse selection component of both quoted and 
effective bid-ask spreads, PIN, the interaction between stock returns and trading volume 
(Llorente et al. 2002) and liquidity measures. They find that their composite index of 
information asymmetry is most highly associated with PIN (coefficient = 0.51), while 
the correlation coefficients for other information asymmetry measures are all below 
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0.30.      
     
2.2 The choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions  
The choice of payment method in M&As has been extensive examined. Prior 
literature documents that the choice of payment method can be explained by differential 
tax treatment (Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson, 1988; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991), 
information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hansen, 1987), capital structure and 
corporate control motives (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1988), and behavioural arguments 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).  
Accordingly, a number of firm characteristics such as firm size, asset tangibility, 
growth opportunities, financial leverage, and stock price run-up have been found to 
explain the choice of payment method. For example, larger firms are likely to have 
better access to debt markets making cash financing more feasible (Faccio and Masulis, 
2005). In addition, firms with more tangible assets have a lower cost of debt which 
makes cash financing more attractive (Myers, 1977), whilst managers of firms with 
valuable investment opportunities prefer to finance investments with stock because it 
allows them to retain valuable cash resources (Jung, Kim, and Stulz, 1996; Martin, 
1996). Bidders with higher financial leverage are likely to find it difficult to issue 
further debt which therefore increases the likelihood of stock payment (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980; Faccio and Masulis, 2005), and bidders with a recent stock price run-up 
prefer to finance acquisitions with equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hansen, 1987). 
 
2.3 PIN, information asymmetry, and the choice of payment method 
In this paper, our focus is on the role PIN plays in M&As. Before a deal occurs, 
both the bidder and target are asymmetrically informed about the true value of their 
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respective firm, as one would expect managers to have superior knowledge of their own 
firm’s value compared with an outsider. In this case, the choice of payment method is 
likely to reveal information about the over/undervaluation of the firm and affect the 
division of synergy gains. A key distinction between a cash deal and a stock deal is that 
the value of a stock deal depends on the cash flows of the combined firm which in turn 
is driven by the ‘true’ value of the bidder, the target and any synergy gains. However, 
the value of a cash deal is independent of these parameters. 
 We predict that the choice of payment method is influenced by an acquiring 
firm’s PIN. Target firm shareholders who face greater external information risk about 
the bidder are likely to demand higher returns to hold the acquiring firm’s stock. This 
will require the bidder to offer a greater number of shares as payment to convince target 
shareholders to accept the bid, thus increasing the cost of the acquisition. We therefore 
expect that cash payment, which is less sensitive to private information, will be the 
preferred choice of payment method for bidders with a higher degree of private 
information (higher PINs). On the other hand, firms with lower PINs are more likely to 
choose stock or a hybrid method of payment as their stock is less likely to be discounted 
by target firm shareholders. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Bidders with higher PINs use a higher proportion of cash financing. 
 
In contrast to the relation between acquiring firms’ information asymmetry and 
payment method, two opposing arguments have been documented in regards to the 
relation between target firms’ information asymmetry and the method of payment. On 
the one hand, Hansen (1987) argues that bidders who plan to acquire targets with higher 
information risk are less likely to pay cash since cash payment increases the risk of 
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overpaying. In consequence these bidders are more likely to use equity financing as it 
enables the bidder to share the target’s information risk with the target firm shareholders 
since the value of a stock offer depends on the cash flows of the acquirer, the target and 
any synergy gains. Empirically, Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2013) use the 
quality of financial reporting as a proxy for information risk and find consistent with 
Hansen’s (1987) argument that bidders tend to share the information risk with target 
shareholders by using more equity financing to acquire targets with poor financial 
reporting quality (i.e., high information risk).  
On the other hand, Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) argue and find 
that the choice of payment method in M&As is driven by the trade-off between the cost 
of overpayment (higher in a cash offer) and the likelihood of bid success (higher in a 
cash offer). In the presence of rival bidders who also face such a trade-off, a cash offer 
by a bidder signals to potential rival bidders that its private valuation of the target is 
higher, thereby helps to deter competition from other rival bidders and hence increases 
the probability of success. Furthermore, the advantage of deterring competition is 
greater when the level of the target’s information asymmetry faced by rival bidders is 
higher. As a result, Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) find that bidders are 
more likely to use cash financing rather than stock financing when they face a high 
level of information asymmetry in evaluating the target. 
Given the contrasting evidence documented, we believe a further examination of 
the association between payment method and target firm PINs is warranted and we 
consider the direction of the association an empirical question. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 




2.4 Acquirer PIN and acquirer announcement returns  
Acquisitions may provide firms with potential benefits including economics of 
scale, vertical integration and synergies. However, prior literature has generally found 
that acquisitions are at best wealth neutral for acquiring firm shareholders, and 
potentially wealth destroying upon deal announcement (Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford, 2001; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005). For example, Betton, Eckbo, 
and Thorburn (2008) show that the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around 
the announcement of an M&A deal is close to zero. The worst-case scenario is when 
large bidders make acquisitions of a public target in an all equity deal.  
One traditional explanation for the negative bidder announcement returns is 
information asymmetry. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987) suggest that by 
making equity financed bids managers are likely to provide a signal to the market that 
their firm’s common stock is overvalued. Consistent with this prediction, Chang (1998) 
and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) show that equity offers are associated with 
poorer acquirer returns, while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) document that 
acquirers with higher information asymmetry experience higher announcement returns 
in cash financed deals. 
Consistent with the finding of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007), we 
predict acquirers with a higher PIN experience higher abnormal returns in cash deals as 
it is viewed as a positive signal by the market, but lower abnormal returns in stock deals 
which is perceived as a sign of share price overvaluation. Thus, we expect a positive 
association between PINs and acquirers’ announcement-period returns for cash deals, 
but a negative relation between PINs and announcement returns for stock deals. This 
give rise to our third hypothesis: 
H3a: Bidders with higher PINs obtain higher announcement returns when 
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paying by cash. 
H3b: Bidders with higher PINs obtain lower announcement returns when 
paying by stock. 
 
2.5 Target firm announcement returns and PIN 
On the flip side, prior literature provides unambiguous evidence that target firm 
shareholders are generally the winners in M&A transactions. Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) report that the average 
announcement abnormal returns for target firms are significantly positive at around 
15%, and are approximately 20% for all-cash deals. The well documented “winner’s 
curse” is one of the main reasons for the positive abnormal announcements returns for 
target firms. Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) suggest that the bidder who mostly 
overestimates the value of the target firm will be the winning bidder, and the failure to 
discount bids in response to greater uncertainty increases the magnitude of the winner’s 
curse. McNichols and Stubben (2015) find empirical evidence to show that targets with 
higher information risk (a lower quality of accounting information) are more difficult 
to value and are more likely to result in overvaluation by acquirers.  
Consistent with prior findings, we expect that bidders are more likely to overpay 
when acquiring targets with higher PINs, as the reduced precision in the estimate of 
target firm value increases the likelihood that the bidder offers an overvalued price. We 
therefore expect a positive association between target announcement returns and target 
PINs, and a negative relation between bidder announcement returns and target PINs. 
Furthermore, we expect the above associations to only exist in cash deals as Hansen 
(1987) suggests that acquirers use equity financing to acquire targets that they know to 
have high information risk in order to share the high information risk with the target’s 
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shareholders. Hence, one would expect an equity financed acquirer to not overpay for 
the target as they have already discovered the high level of information risk in the target 
firm. These lead to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4a: Targets with higher PINs obtain higher announcement returns in cash 
deals. 
H4b: Bidders obtain lower announcement returns when acquiring targets with 
high PINs in cash deals. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. The sample 
We obtain our sample of US mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson 
Financial SDC M&A Database. Our sample meets the following criteria: 1) 
observations are from the period of 1994-2011; 2) deals are completed; 3) the method 
of payment is known; 4) the transaction is greater than US$1 million and at least 1% of 
the acquirer’s market value of equity; 5) the acquirer and target firms are not from the 
financial or utility industry and have financial statement information and stock return 
data available on Compustat and CRSP respectively; 6) the PIN measure for the 
acquirer and target is available. 2  Our final sample includes 1,724 mergers and 
acquisitions made by 1,235 acquirers. The definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table 1. 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the mergers and acquisitions by year and 
industry. Panel A shows that the number of M&A deals dropped significantly in 2001-
02 and 2009, at the end of the tech-boom and the global financial crisis periods 
                                                 
2 We thank Stephen Brown for making yearly PINs for the period from 1993 and 2010 publicly 
available at scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data. See Brown and Hillegeist (2007) for details in 
constructing the PINs. 
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respectively. Panel B shows that a majority of the acquirers are from the manufacturing, 
services, and transportation and communications industry.  
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 
 
3.2. Probability of informed trading 
The yearly PIN measure provided by Stephen Brown are computed using the 
Venter and de Jongh (2006) model and is an extended version of the popular EKO 
market microstructure model (Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1997). PIN is a firm-specific 
estimate of the probability that a trade originates from a privately informed investor and 
therefore it directly captures the amount of PINs among investors in the secondary 
market. The extension by Venter and de Jongh (2006) improves the model’s ability to 
fit data in the real world by allowing for a strong positive correlation between buy and 
sell orders, which in turn accommodates for the arrival of public information in the 
market without necessarily attributing it to trading on private information. Overall, 
PINs computed using the Venter and de Jongh (2006) model better capture the 
asymmetric information component of PIN as opposed to the liquidity component of 
PIN as argued by Duarte and Young (2009). Nevertheless, we control for firm liquidity 
using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure in all of our regressions to ensure that our 
results are not driven by liquidity captured in the PIN component. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics. Yearly PINs and firm characteristics are all 
measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement. Panel A reports 
that the average acquirer and target PIN are 0.14 and 0.17 respectively, and on average 
deals are funded by 68% cash (Cashper). Panel B shows that the average 
announcement-period acquirer CARs are approximately 0% while the average CARs 
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for the targets are much higher at around 14%, which is consistent with the findings in 
prior literature (Dong et al., 2006; Ahern, 2012). Panels C and D show that the average 
acquirer is larger and has stock that is more liquid than the average target firm. Lastly 
Panel E shows that within the sample, 23% of M&As are tender offers and 18% are 
cross-industry deals.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.4. Correlations between PIN, firm characteristics and information asymmetry  
  The key contribution of our paper is in examining the role of PIN in M&As, as 
there is already a battery of papers that documents the association between commonly 
used information asymmetry measures and M&A outcomes. To confirm that PINs differ 
systematically from the measures of information asymmetry commonly used in the 
literature, we present a correlation matrix between PINs, firm characteristics, and 
several measures of information asymmetry for both the acquirer and the target firms. 
Specifically, we use tangibility of a firm’s assets, the dispersion of analyst forecasts 
(Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007), 
analyst forecast errors (Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009), earnings quality 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2015), idiosyncratic volatility and the number of large 
shareholders (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007) as explicit measures of 
information asymmetry. Table 4 shows that firms with higher PINs are smaller and have 
less liquid stocks and a lower valuation. More importantly, consistent with our 
expectations, the results show that PIN has a very low correlation with common 
measures of information asymmetry (<0.09), suggesting that PIN differs systematically 
from the information asymmetry measures commonly used in the M&A literature.  





4.1 Results on PIN and method of payment  
Table 5 reports the regression results of the relationship between acquirer PIN, 
target PIN, and the method of payment in M&As controlling for various acquirer and 
target firm characteristics and deal characteristics. To capture the incremental impact of 
PIN on M&A outcomes, we control for several measures of information asymmetry for 
both the acquirer and the target. Specifically, we control for the difference between 
acquirer’s and target’s dispersion of analyst forecasts (Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz, 2007; Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009), analyst forecast errors 
(Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan, 2009), earnings quality measured by abnormal 
accruals (McNichols and Stubben, 2015), idiosyncratic volatility and the number of 
large shareholders (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007).3 To ensure that stock 
illiquidity is not driving our results, we also include the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure as a control variable. In addition, due to the presence of serial acquirers in our 
sample, the residuals in our regressions can be correlated and therefore may overstate 
the t-statistics (Petersen, 2009). To control for this potential issue, we cluster standard 
errors by acquiring firm in all our regressions. We also control for time and industry 
fixed effects in all of our regression models.  
We start with a two-boundary Tobit model that regresses the percentage of cash 
financing on acquirer PIN and target PIN controlling for various acquirer and target 
firm characteristics. The results in Column (1) show that acquirers with higher PINs 
use a higher percentage of cash in financing their M&A deals, and also acquirers tend 
                                                 
3 Controlling for the difference in various information asymmetry measures helps us to better interpret 
the results. Our results are similar if we control for various information asymmetry measures separately 
for acquirers and targets. 
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to use more equity financing when acquiring targets with higher PINs. Both of these 
relationships are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The coefficients of firm-level control variables exhibit the expected signs. Larger 
firms tend to use more cash due to their better access to debt financing (Faccio and 
Masulis, 2005); firms with more tangible assets have a lower cost of debt, which makes 
cash financing more attractive (Myers, 1977); firms with more investment opportunities 
prefer to use equity financing because it allows them to have more discretion over their 
internal capital (Martin, 1996); highly leverage firms are more constrained in their 
ability to issue debt and as a consequence are more likely use stock financing (Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005); bidders prefer to finance with stock when their equity experiences 
a recent stock price run-up and has a higher market valuation (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Hansen, 1987); and highly leveraged targets have higher level of information risk and 
hence bidders are more likely to use equity financing to share the target’s high 
information risk (Petacchi, 2015). Furthermore, we see that all of the variables 
capturing the difference in information asymmetry between the acquirer and target are 
positively related (at the 1% level) to the percentage of cash financing, which is 
consistent with the view that acquirers with higher information asymmetry are more 
likely to use cash financing due to their high cost of equity. 
Next, we include deal level controls in Column (2). The results show that the 
coefficient estimates of acquirer PIN and target PIN continue to be significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficients of our deal-level control variables also exhibit the expected signs. 
Acquirers tend to use cash as the method of payment in tender offers in order to avoid 
long delays as tender offers involving stock as the financing method must be made in 
accordance with the Securities Act of 1933 (Gilson, 1986; Fishman, 1989); bidders 
acquiring large targets are more likely to use equity financing to share the information 
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risk as information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to 
those of a bidder (Hansen, 1987); and bidders are more likely to use equity financing to 
acquire targets in a different industry to share the target’s information risk due to their 
lack of knowledge  in the target industry.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
For robustness, we follow Faccio and Masulis (2005) and use an ordered Probit 
model to examine the association between acquirer and target PINs and the method of 
payment in M&As. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for pure stock deals, 2 
for mixed stock and cash and 3 for all-cash deals. The results are reported in Columns 
(3) and (4). Consistent with the results in Columns (1) and (2), we show that acquirers 
with higher PINs are more likely to use cash financing, and acquirers are more likely to 
use equity financing when acquiring targets with higher PINs. Overall, the results in 
Table 5 confirms the first and second hypothesis that acquirers with a higher PIN are 
more likely to use cash financing as cash is less sensitive to private information than 
stock, and bidders use more equity financing to acquire targets with a higher PIN to 
share the target’s information risk with the target’s shareholders as suggested by Hansen 
(1987). 
 
4.2 Results on PIN and acquirer announcement returns  
Next, we examine the relation between PIN and acquirer announcement returns. 
To calculate acquirer abnormal returns around the deal announcement, we follow 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) by first estimating the market model for each acquirer 
over a 200-day period ending 11 days before the announcement date (-210, -11) with 
the CRSP value-weighted return used as the reference market return. We then use the 
estimated parameters to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a five-
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day (-2, 2) event window centered on the announcement date.  
The results in Table 5 suggest that the choice of method of payment in takeovers 
is non-random, and are associated with bidder and target firm characteristics. In 
addition, acquisition decisions, like many other firm decisions, are also non-random 
and influenced by managerial expectations and firm characteristics. To control for 
possible self-selection bias, we follow Huang et al. (2014) and use a two-stage 
Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). In particular, in the first stage, we employ a probit 
regression of the likelihood of takeovers for the full sample, where firm size, Tobin’s 
Q, leverage, asset tangibility, leverage, stock price run-up, sales growth and price-to-
earnings ratio are used as the explanatory variables (Huang et al. 2014). For cash, mixed 
or stock deals, we model the likelihood of cash (or stock) deals using the specification 
in Column 4 of Table 5 as the first-stage probit model. In the second stage, we include 
the Inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory variable in the analyses of announcement 
returns. Table 6 presents the results of the second stage regression on the relationship 
between PINs and acquirer CARs around the deal announcement date.    
The results in Column 1 of Table 6 show that acquirers with higher PINs are more 
likely to experience higher CARs around the deal announcement date. When dividing 
the sample into cash-only deals, mixed deals, and stock-only deals, we find that the 
positive relationship between acquirer PINs and announcement-period CARs is only 
evident in cash deals (at the 1% level), consistent with H3a that acquirers with a higher 
PIN are likely to obtain a higher abnormal announcement return for cash deals. 
However, we fail to find supportive evidence on H3b that bidders with higher PINs 
obtain lower announcement returns when paying by stock, as the coefficient on bidder 
PINs is negative but insignificant for stock deals. This suggests that, different from 
other common measures of information asymmetry, the association between PINs and 
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announcement returns is not existent when stock is used as a medium of exchange in 
takeovers. 
We also include target PINs and examine its relation with acquirer announcement 
returns. Consistent with the view that higher PINs of the targets are likely to lead to 
reduced precision in the estimate of target firm value and an increased likelihood of 
overvalued offer prices, we find a negative and significant association between target 
PINs and acquirer returns, especially for cash deals. This supports H4b that bidders 
obtain lower announcement returns when acquiring targets with high PINs in cash deals.   
Overall, our results of a positive relation between acquirers’ PINs and 
announcement returns for cash offers are consistent with the finding of Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) that cash offers made by bidders with high information 
asymmetry are considered a signal of undervaluation of the bidder’s equity, thereby 
leading to higher announcement-period abnormal returns.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.3 Results on Target PIN and target announcement returns 
Lastly, we examine the relation between PINs and target firm announcement 
returns. Table 7 presents the regression results on the relation between acquirer PINs, 
target PINs and target CARs around the deal announcement date. We use the same 
procedure to calculate target firms’ 5-day CAR around the deal announcement as 
employed for acquiring firms, and the Heckman two-stage model to address possible 
selection bias. The results in Column (1) show that, on average, targets with higher 
PINs have higher announcement-period CARs. When separating deals into cash, mixed 
and stock deals, we find that the positive and significant association between target 
PINs and CARs is only evident in the sample of cash deals (at the 5% level). The results 
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are consistent with H4a that target firms with higher PINs obtain higher announcement 
returns when receiving cash payment. This finding also supports the view that bidders 
who have discovered the high level of information asymmetry in the target firm are 
likely to use more equity financing when acquiring targets to share the information risk 
with the target’s shareholders. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5. Further analysis 
5.1 Offer premium and PIN 
Since the actual offer prices of deals are often available, prior research also 
analyse takeover premiums in addition to the announcement-period abnormal returns 
of the target firms. Similar to the argument for the targets announcement-period CARs, 
we expect target PINs to be positively related to takeover premiums and to be 
concentrated in cash deals. Table 8 reports the regression results on the relation between 
PIN and takeover premiums. Following prior studies (Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011; 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2012), the takeover premium is defined as the 4-week 
bid premium in percentage reported by SDC (field PREM4WK). The 4-week bid 
premium is calculated as the offer price over target’s closing stock price 4 weeks prior 
to the announcement date.  
Similar to the results for announcement-period CARs in Table 7, the results in 
Column 1 show that bidders tend to pay a higher takeover premium when acquiring 
targets with higher PINs. However, acquirer PINs are not significantly associated with 
takeover premium. When considering cash, mixed and stock deals separately, we find 
that a positive relationship between targets’ PIN and takeover premium only occurs in 
cash deals (significant at the 10% level). Interestingly, the association between target 
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PIN and takeover premiums in equity deals is negative, suggesting that the sharing of 
information risk with target shareholders results in reduced offer prices. Overall, the 
results in Table 8 confirm that targets with higher PINs tend to receive a higher takeover 
premium in cash deals.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.2 Alternative measure of PIN 
Many of the seminal empirical studies (e.g. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002; 
Easley and O’Hara, 2004) investigating the role of PIN on asset pricing and corporate 
policies use the EKO PIN measure developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). 
For our results to be comparable to those in these previous studies, we also use the EKO 
PIN provided by Soeren Hvidkjaer to examine the relationship between PIN and 
acquisition outcomes. This alternative PIN measure covers the period from 1983 to 
2001.4 In addition, we acknowledge that more than half of our sample firms are from 
the manufacturing industry. While industry fixed effect is included in our analysis, we 
also use an industry-adjusted PIN measure to minimize the effect of potential outliers.5 
Table 9 presents the results that use the industry-adjusted PIN measure and the EKO 
PIN measure. We find that our main results continue to hold.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
       
5.3 PIN and method of payment: The role of corporate governance and Reg FD 
Agency theory predicts that, due to conflict of interest, managers do not always 
act in the best interest of shareholders in corporate decisions such as mergers and 
                                                 
4Source: https://sites.google.com/site/hvidkjaer/data. We thank Soeren Hvidkjaer for making the data 
publicly available. 
5 We thank the reviewer for suggesting the use of the industry-adjusted PIN measure. 
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acquisitions. Thus, corporate governance mechanisms can play an important role in 
preventing managers from engaging in value-destroying acquisitions. For example, 
Masulis et al. (2007) document that acquiring firms with more antitakeover provisions 
obtain lower announcement returns, suggesting managers who are immune to the 
disciplining of the takeover market tend to engage in value-destroying takeovers. 
However, it is important to note that “corporate governance does not have a single and 
unique impact on takeovers (Aktas et al. 2016: p.248)”. Accordingly, it is unclear 
whether the association between PINs and acquisition outcomes would be more 
pronounced or weaker among firms with strong governance environments.  
On the one hand, the relation between PINs and acquisition outcomes can be 
weaker if a better governance environment and monitoring reduce information 
asymmetry and insider trading. On the other hand, Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that 
firms with fewer antitakeover provisions (more external disciplining) demonstrate a 
higher degree of private information flow, indicating a more pronounced relation 
between PINs and takeover outcomes. To examine the effect of governance, we follow 
Masulis et al. (2007) to include the G-Index based on a firm’s antitakeover provisions 
in the regression models and its interaction with PIN. The results reported in Column 
(1) of Table 10 show that, compared to acquirers with fewer antitakeover provisions, 
bidders with less external disciplining (i.e., more provisions) are less inclined to use 
cash financing when its own PIN is high, but tend to use more cash financing when 
acquiring targets with a high PIN to share the target’s information risk (Hansen 1987).6 
The finding is consistent with Masulis et al. (2007) that managerial tendency of 
engaging in value-destroying takeovers increases with less disciplining from a firm’s 
                                                 
6 We also conduct the tests for announcement returns but do not find any significant difference for firms 




Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 2000 aimed to prohibit disclosure of material private information 
to selected market participants. However, prior research documents mixed evidence on 
the effectiveness of Regulation FD in reducing a firm’s degree of information 
asymmetry. Sidhu et al. (2008) show that Nasdaq’s stocks’ degree of information 
asymmetry increases by about 40% after the adoption of Regulation FD. On the other 
hand, Eleswarapu et al. (2004) document a significant decline in information 
asymmetry following Regulation FD. Given the mixed evidence on the effectiveness of 
Regulation FD, it is unclear whether and how the implementation of Regulation FD 
affects the relation between PINs and acquisition outcomes. We assess the impact of 
Regulation FD by interacting the indicator of Regulation FD with PIN. The results of 
our analysis in Table 10 shows that, after the implementation of Regulation FD in 2000, 
bidders with high PINs are less likely to use cash financing for mergers and acquisitions, 
but continue to rely on more equity financing when acquiring targets with high PINs.7   
 [Insert Table 10 here]  
 
6. Conclusion 
Previous M&A research documents that information asymmetry plays an 
important role in mergers and acquisitions. This study extends this body of research to 
examine the incremental role of information asymmetry across investor groups (i.e., 
PIN) on the choice of payment method in M&As. We suggest that cash, being less 
sensitive to private information held by investors than stock, is the preferred choice of 
                                                 




payment method for bidders with large amounts of private information. We find that 
acquirers with higher PINs use a greater proportion of cash in financing their M&A 
deals after controlling for various information asymmetry measures. We also find that 
acquirers are more likely to use stock financing to acquire targets with higher PINs, 
confirming the notion that acquirers use equity to share the information risk with target 
shareholders.  
We then consider the association between PIN and acquirers’ and targets’ 
cumulative abnormal returns around the deal announcement date. Our results 
demonstrate that acquirers with higher PINs obtain higher CARs around the deal 
announcement in cash financed deals as the market considers cash offers as a signal 
that the acquirer’s stock is undervalued. Similarly, targets with higher PINs are found 
to experience higher CARs and offer premiums in cash financed deals since paying by 
cash shows that the acquirer is not likely to have noticed the information risk in the 
target firm and is likely to have overpaid.  
Overall, our paper contributes to the extant literature on M&As by showing that 
PIN plays a crucial role in affecting M&A outcomes beyond other commonly used 
information asymmetry measures. Future research in this area may focus on examining 
whether PIN affects other types of corporate policies such as managerial compensation 
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Panel A: PIN and method of payment 
PIN  The probability of informed trading measure used in Brown and 





The probability of informed trading measure computed using 
the EKO model in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010) for the 
firm at the end of the year before the acquisition. 
Source:http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/probability-
informed-trade-easley-et-al-model 
Cashper Cash as percentage of the overall value of the payment. Cash 
includes actual cash, liabilities and newly issued notes. Source: 
SDC. 
Choice Equal to 1 for pure stock deals, 2 for mixed stock and cash and 
3 for all cash deals. Source: SDC 
Panel B: CAR and takeover premium  
Acquirer CAR (-2,+2) 
 
Acquiring firm five day cumulative abnormal return calculated 
using the market model. The market model parameters are 
estimated over the period (-210,-11) with the CRSP equally 
weighted return as the market index. Source: CRSP 
Target CAR (-2,+2)  
 
Target firm five day cumulative abnormal return calculated 
using the market model. The market model parameters are 
estimated over the period (-210,-11) with the CRSP equally 
weighted return as the market index. Source: CRSP 
Premium Difference between the offer price and the target share price 4 
weeks prior to the announcement, expressed as a percentage. 
Source: SDC 




The log of net sales (SALE) of the acquirer at the end of the 
year before the acquisition. Source: Compustat. 
Acquirer’s ratio of fixed assets (PPE) to total assets (AT) at the 
end of the year before the acquisition. Source: Compustat. 
Tobin’s q Acquirer’s market value of assets over book value of assets (AT 
- CEQ + CSHO*PRCC)/AT) at the end of the year before the 
acquisition. Source: Compustat. 
Leverage 
 
Acquirer’s book value of debt (DLTT+DLC) divided by book 
value of total assets (AT) at the end of the year before the 
acquisition. Source: Compustat. 




Acquirer’s buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the 
period (-210,-11) days. The market index is the CRSP value-
weighted return. Source: CRSP.  
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio measured as annual average of 
the daily ratio of absolute value of stock return divided by dollar 




Forecast dispersion The standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts over the 
absolute value of the mean earnings forecasts before the deal 
announcement. Source: I/B/E/S.  
Forecast error The difference between the mean earnings forecast before the 
deal announcement and the actual earnings, divided by share 













The absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the 
modified version of the Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Source: Compustat 
Dummy variable that equals one if the company paid a 
dividend, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Number of institutional investors with a holding of 5% of more. 
Source: 13f filings 
The standard deviation of monthly returns over the year. Source: 
CRSP. 
Governance index based on 24 antitakeover provisions. Source: 
Gompers et al. (2003) 
Dummy variable that equals one for years 2001 and onwards, 
and zero otherwise.  
Panel D: Deal characteristics 
Tender offer Dummy variable that equals one if the deal is a tender offer and 
zero otherwise. Source: SDC. 
Relative deal size Ratio of the deal value to the deal value plus the acquirer’s 
market capitalization at the end of the year before the 
acquisition. Source: SDC and Compustat. 
Cross industry Dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and target do 
not share a 2-digit SIC industry. Source: SDC. 
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Table 2: Year and Industry Distribution of M&As 
This table reports the year (Panel A) and industry distribution (Panel B) of the M&A 
transactions. 
 
Panel A: M&A sample distribution by year   
Year Frequency % 
1994 95 5.51 
1995 127 7.37 
1996 131 7.6 
1997 136 7.89 
1998 195 11.31 
1999 148 8.58 
2000 152 8.82 
2001 60 3.48 
2002 46 2.67 
2003 60 3.48 
2004 74 4.29 
2005 87 5.05 
2006 94 5.45 
2007 107 6.21 
2008 68 3.94 
2009 18 1.04 
2010 56 3.25 
2011 70 4.06 
Total 1,724 100.00 
Panel B: M&A sample distribution by industry 
SIC code Frequency % 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 3 0.17 
10-14 Mining 79 4.58 
15-17 Construction 10 0.58 
20-39 Manufacturing 888 51.51 
40-48 Transportation and Communications 154 8.93 
50-51 Wholesale Trade 58 3.36 
52-59 Retail Trade 154 8.93 
70-89 Services 377 21.87 
90-99 Nonclassifiable 1 0.06 





Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for variables constructed based on the sample of 1,724 
completed mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1994 and 2011. Panel A reports 
summary statistics for PIN and method of payment. Panel B reports summary statistics for 
CARs and takeover premiums. Panel C reports summary statistics for acquirer characteristics. 
Panel D reports summary statistics for target characteristics. Panel E reports summary statistics 
for deal characteristics. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
 
Variable Mean St Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: PIN and Method of Payment 
Acquirer PIN 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.18 
Target PIN 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.21 
Cashper 68.22 43.89 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Choice 2.42 0.80 2.00 3.00 3.00 
Panel B: CAR and Takeover premium 
Acquirer CAR (%) -0.05 9.41 -4.27 0.28 4.39 
Target CAR (%) 13.66 21.02 1.04 7.77 21.43 
Premium (%) 29.99 36.23 5.44 26.26 48.74 
Panel C: Bidder Characteristics 
Firm size 7.41 1.91 6.09 7.31 8.82 
Asset tangibility 0.51 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.73 
Dividend payer 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Tobin’s q 2.35 2.32 1.34 1.80 2.60 
Leverage 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.31 
Amihud illiquidity 0.07 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Stock price run-up -0.04 0.51 -0.28 -0.03 0.23 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Number of blockholders 1.92 1.58 1.00 1.75 2.75 
Forecast dispersion 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Forecast error 0.04 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Abnormal accruals 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.12 
Panel D: Target Characteristics 
Firm size 6.43 1.94 5.07 6.25 7.68 
Asset tangibility 0.50 0.38 0.20 0.41 0.70 
Tobin’s q 2.17 1.67 1.28 1.68 2.39 
Leverage 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.31 
Amihud illiquidity 0.21 1.90 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Stock price run-up -0.03 0.60 -0.32 -0.03 0.27 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Number of blockholders 1.91 1.54 1.00 1.75 2.75 
Forecast dispersion 0.10 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.07 
Forecast error 0.04 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Abnormal accruals 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.08 
Panel E: Deal Characteristics 
Tender offer 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relative deal size 0.27 0.42 0.05 0.11 0.29 
Cross industry 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4: Correlation between PIN, Firm Characteristics and Various Information Asymmetry Measures 
This table presents the correlation matrix between PIN, firm characteristics, and various information asymmetry measures. Panel A reports correlations between 
acquirer PIN and acquirer firm characteristics and information asymmetry. Panel B reports correlations between target PIN and target firm characteristics and 
information asymmetry. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
 
Panel A             
 
Acquirer 
PIN  Firm size 
Asset 













Acquirer PIN 1.00            
Firm size -0.36 1.00           
Asset tangibility 0.08 0.18 1.00          
Tobin’s q -0.15 -0.11 -0.15 1.00         
Leverage 0.08 0.19 0.26 -0.21 1.00        
illiquidity 0.17 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 1.00       
Stock price run-up 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.02 1.00      
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.07 -0.54 -0.20 0.17 -0.15 0.10 -0.05 1.00     
Number of blockholders -0.01 -0.23 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 1.00    
Forecast dispersion 0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.02 1.00   
Forecast error 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 1.00  
Abnormal accruals 0.00 -0.19 -0.15 0.19 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.25 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 1.00 
Panel B             
 
Target 
PIN  Firm size 
Asset 













Target PIN 1.00            
Firm size -0.32 1.00           
Asset tangibility 0.03 0.27 1.00          
Tobin’s q -0.20 -0.15 -0.17 1.00         
Leverage 0.05 0.23 0.30 -0.19 1.00        
illiquidity 0.18 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 1.00       
Stock price run-up 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.07 1.00      
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.09 -0.58 -0.28 0.15 -0.12 0.14 0.02 1.00     
Number of blockholders 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 1.00    
Forecast dispersion 0.07 -0.09 0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.01 1.00   
Forecast error 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.05 1.00  




Table 5: PIN and Method of Payment 
This table reports the regressions of the method of payment in M&As on acquirer and target 
firm PIN. The estimations in columns (1) and (2) are based on a two-boundary Tobit model to 
reflect the lower and upper bound on the dependent variable (Cashper). The estimations in 
columns (3) and (4) are based on an ordered Probit model. Variable definitions are provided in 
Table 1. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are 
displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 
  Dep. = Cashper Dep.=Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquirer PIN 457.467*** 522.266*** 1.927** 2.472*** 
 (14.127) (18.746) (2.481) (2.936) 
Target PIN -248.493*** -376.302*** -0.937 -1.642** 
 (-8.862) (-15.772) (-1.473) (-2.159) 
Firm size -0.290 -13.518*** 0.010 -0.052* 
 (-0.370) (-20.171) (0.344) (-1.718) 
Asset tangibility 67.355*** 56.106*** 0.331** 0.340** 
 (9.120) (8.670) (2.403) (2.296) 
Dividend payer 55.879*** 36.379*** 0.236*** 0.194** 
 (10.450) (7.737) (2.577) (2.034) 
Tobin’s q -29.650*** -28.615*** -0.152*** -0.179*** 
 (-17.997) (-20.850) (-4.823) (-5.291) 
Leverage -163.218*** -84.222*** -0.901*** -0.672** 
 (-10.640) (-6.285) (-3.397) (-2.456) 
Illiquidity 103.642*** 62.129*** 0.469** 0.364* 
 (16.070) (11.063) (2.409) (1.859) 
Stock price run-up -74.168*** -39.820*** -0.322*** -0.213** 
 (-31.857) (-18.415) (-3.769) (-2.417) 
Target Tobin’s q 6.672*** 12.740*** 0.024 0.061** 
 (4.074) (9.182) (0.864) (2.142) 
Target Leverage -143.993*** -73.854*** -0.335 -0.013 
 (-10.688) (-6.278) (-1.528) (-0.055) 
Target Illiquidity -5.836*** -2.884* -0.037 -0.033 
 (-4.381) (-1.915) (-0.691) (-0.587) 
Target stock price run-up 10.209*** 14.303*** 0.012 0.039 
 (5.143) (8.169) (0.167) (0.560) 
Diff in forecast dispersion 28.311*** 15.994*** 0.085 0.045 
 (14.534) (10.267) (1.023) (0.567) 
Diff in forecast error -19.081** 7.309 0.062 0.203 
 (-2.482) (1.199) (0.147) (0.444) 
Diff in abnormal accruals -21.760*** 18.742*** -0.094 0.016 
 (-2.870) (3.071) (-0.302) (0.049) 
Diff in idiosyncratic vol. 4082.038*** 4226.532*** 19.158*** 23.775*** 
 (21.974) (27.479) (5.209) (6.456) 
Diff in no. of blockholders -8.797*** -2.938*** -0.056** -0.049* 
 (-22.098) (-8.017) (-2.286) (-1.879) 
Tender offer  128.530***  0.640*** 
  (28.296)  (6.335) 
Relative deal size  -242.139***  -1.210*** 
  (-54.760)  (-10.222) 
Cross-industry  -94.278***  -0.586*** 
  (-24.899)  (-6.340) 
Intercept 1 1372.236*** 999.092*** -5.842*** -5.390*** 
 (216.828) (184.088) (-16.180) (-12.325) 
Intercept 2   -5.128*** -4.529*** 
   (-13.640) (-36.535) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1724 1724 1724 1724 




Table 6: PIN and Acquirer CAR 
This table reports the regressions of acquirer CAR around the deal announcement date on acquirer and target PIN. 
Columns (1) reports regression results for the entire sample. Columns (2) reports regression results for pure cash 
deals. Columns (3) reports regression results for mixed deals. Columns (4) reports regression results for pure stock 
deals. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Dep. = Acquirer CAR All deals Cash deals Mixed deals Stock deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquirer PIN 36.840** 61.976*** 185.072 -140.647 
 (1.989) (4.271) (1.055) (-0.501) 
Target PIN -19.413 -35.481*** -112.698 90.387 
 (-1.536) (-3.362) (-0.952) (0.486) 
Firm size -1.082** -1.679*** -3.825 2.784 
 (-2.550) (-4.731) (-0.980) (0.468) 
Asset tangibility 3.584 6.957*** 25.318 -21.076 
 (1.369) (3.444) (1.028) (-0.551) 
Dividend payer 2.768* 4.950*** 13.950 -10.784 
 (1.783) (4.175) (0.985) (-0.483) 
Tobin’s q -2.550* -4.396*** -12.491 9.333 
 (-1.921) (-4.365) (-0.957) (0.453) 
Leverage -6.935 -15.817*** -41.165 39.037 
 (-1.297) (-3.685) (-0.851) (0.513) 
Illiquidity 3.601 7.027*** 31.638 -9.935 
 (1.456) (4.006) (1.188) (-0.236) 
Stock price run-up -3.238* -6.015*** -16.348 13.240 
 (-1.880) (-3.858) (-1.047) (0.549) 
Target Tobin's q 0.567 1.282*** 4.084 -3.808 
 (1.195) (2.860) (0.919) (-0.555) 
Target Leverage 0.483 1.556 -2.947 -3.002 
 (0.320) (0.632) (-1.019) (-0.860) 
Target Illiquidity -0.497* -0.550* -3.261 1.690 
 (-1.794) (-1.691) (-1.165) (0.439) 
Target stock price run-up 0.756 1.349 3.908 -2.065 
 (1.238) (1.474) (1.283) (-0.467) 
Diff in forecast dispersion -0.575 2.062 0.670 -2.304 
 (-0.655) (1.376) (0.203) (-0.456) 
Diff in forecast error 8.467** 26.931*** 8.869 -10.575 
 (2.032) (3.538) (0.594) (-0.449) 
Diff in abnormal accruals 2.550 2.937 -1.653 -0.004 
 (1.149) (1.058) (-0.301) (-0.001) 
Diff in idiosyncratic vol. 275.545 564.482*** 1472.573 -1295.184 
 (1.590) (4.215) (0.856) (-0.478) 
Diff in no. of blockholders -0.206 -1.112*** -2.869 2.317 
 (-0.511) (-3.192) (-0.801) (0.412) 
Tender offer 10.025** 16.846*** 45.121 -31.538 
 (2.192) (5.166) (0.984) (-0.440) 
Relative deal size -17.247* -23.786*** -84.551 57.784 
 (-1.954) (-3.602) (-0.962) (0.419) 
Cross-industry -7.120* -15.232*** -40.520 31.052 
 (-1.651) (-4.949) (-0.956) (0.464) 
Inverse mills ratio 10.335 23.087*** 69.563 -55.356 
 (1.362) (4.173) (0.925) (-0.471) 
Constant -13.860* -26.883*** -383.546 268.703 
 (-1.692) (-4.431) (-0.931) (0.493) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1723 1062 324 337 
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.108 0.164 0.238 
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Table 7: PIN and Target CAR 
This table reports the regressions of target CAR around the deal announcement date on acquirer and 
target PIN. Columns (1) reports regression results for the entire sample. Columns (2) reports regression 
results for pure cash deals. Columns (3) reports regression results for mixed deals. Columns (4) reports 
regression results for pure stock deals. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. T-statistics are 
calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Dep. = Target CAR All deals Cash deals Mixed deals Stock deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquirer PIN -108.827** -77.360** -551.909 -485.943 
 (-2.576) (-2.426) (-0.918) (-0.933) 
Target PIN 91.015*** 76.157*** 407.700 311.240 
 (3.144) (3.133) (1.003) (0.898) 
Firm size 1.506 0.618 11.271 9.157 
 (1.626) (0.982) (0.890) (0.850) 
Asset tangibility -9.730* -2.489 -73.410 -71.699 
 (-1.733) (-0.629) (-0.881) (-1.021) 
Dividend payer -3.973 -0.850 -45.238 -32.519 
 (-1.173) (-0.362) (-0.978) (-0.798) 
Tobin’s q 5.140* 1.973 42.177 33.139 
 (1.705) (0.914) (0.959) (0.870) 
Leverage 18.177 8.979 155.069 123.295 
 (1.501) (0.849) (0.935) (0.875) 
Illiquidity -6.898 -1.191 -94.402 -66.772 
 (-1.264) (-0.337) (-1.051) (-0.879) 
Stock price run-up 4.261 0.749 46.269 37.887 
 (1.165) (0.215) (0.900) (0.836) 
Target Tobin's q -3.754*** -2.619** -17.541 -12.650 
 (-3.431) (-2.387) (-1.155) (-0.990) 
Target Leverage -6.295 -12.074 5.740 -6.013 
 (-1.523) (-1.577) (0.549) (-0.728) 
Target Illiquidity 0.422 0.803 3.851 6.133 
 (0.743) (0.824) (0.472) (0.874) 
Target stock price run-up -2.933* -1.711 -15.712 -8.097 
 (-1.803) (-0.625) (-1.497) (-0.977) 
Diff in forecast dispersion -0.865 0.351 -9.358 -8.659 
 (-0.555) (0.141) (-0.839) (-0.864) 
Diff in forecast error -11.286* -1.475 -54.621 -40.407 
 (-1.790) (-0.116) (-1.146) (-0.835) 
Diff in abnormal accruals 4.443 2.033 6.405 0.337 
 (0.830) (0.383) (0.227) (0.036) 
Diff in idiosyncratic vol. -1054.138*** -844.760*** -5832.747 -4289.564 
 (-2.637) (-2.900) (-0.990) (-0.866) 
Diff in no. of blockholders 0.328 -0.659 10.062 8.440 
 (0.371) (-0.803) (0.830) (0.801) 
Tender offer -4.893 7.619 -139.804 -126.727 
 (-0.480) (1.152) (-0.907) (-0.960) 
Relative deal size 32.123 12.614 287.168 209.152 
 (1.602) (0.956) (0.959) (0.822) 
Cross-industry 17.720* 6.349 134.435 106.171 
 (1.899) (1.001) (0.941) (0.865) 
Inverse mills ratio -22.679 -4.163 -245.820 -184.898 
 (-1.335) (-0.373) (-0.959) (-0.856) 
Constant 16.580 -4.687 1355.279 893.336 
 (0.914) (-0.378) (0.964) (0.890) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1723 1062 324 337 
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.404 0.067 0.055 
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Table 8: PIN and Takeover Premium 
This table reports the regressions of takeover offer premium on acquirer and target firm PIN. 
Column (1) reports regression results for the entire sample. Column (2) reports regression 
results for pure cash deals. Column (3) reports regression results for mixed deals. Column (4) 
reports regression results for pure stock deals. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. T-
statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by firm and are displayed in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Dep. = Premium All deals Cash deals Mixed deals Stock deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquirer PIN -82.515 -76.166 587.744 1931.513** 
 (-1.169) (-1.205) (0.693) (1.975) 
Target PIN 89.185* 79.843* -331.308 -1267.950* 
 (1.914) (1.726) (-0.575) (-1.936) 
Firm size 2.304 4.498*** -13.333 -47.334** 
 (1.504) (3.086) (-0.733) (-2.252) 
Asset tangibility -10.336 -5.994 77.320 261.746* 
 (-1.063) (-0.724) (0.646) (1.941) 
Dividend payer -3.727 -5.346 50.583 165.231** 
 (-0.680) (-1.030) (0.753) (2.102) 
Tobin’s q 3.799 1.692 -33.520 -145.655** 
 (0.762) (0.363) (-0.532) (-2.012) 
Leverage 12.360 -4.334 -153.707 -538.895** 
 (0.618) (-0.217) (-0.663) (-1.999) 
Illiquidity -1.743 4.315 51.252 267.968* 
 (-0.187) (0.501) (0.395) (1.817) 
Stock price run-up 2.869 -1.055 -47.645 -175.092** 
 (0.453) (-0.174) (-0.642) (-2.070) 
Target Tobin's q -2.926 -2.621 5.501 49.052** 
 (-1.551) (-1.376) (0.256) (2.021) 
Target Leverage -5.265 -0.368 -13.497 -5.349 
 (-0.744) (-0.037) (-0.938) (-0.327) 
Target Illiquidity -0.661 0.894 -6.679 -27.945** 
 (-0.693) (0.505) (-0.557) (-2.068) 
Target stock price run-up 0.922 2.846 7.126 35.040** 
 (0.351) (0.849) (0.486) (2.143) 
Diff in forecast dispersion 4.821 -0.044 21.768 37.394** 
 (1.295) (-0.011) (1.237) (2.055) 
Diff in forecast error 5.563 -5.818 57.728 148.671* 
 (0.397) (-0.133) (0.829) (1.808) 
Diff in abnormal accruals 4.726 -3.689 27.454 14.195 
 (0.507) (-0.354) (0.919) (1.108) 
Diff in idiosyncratic vol. -1189.686* -1253.805** 4389.829 18736.280** 
 (-1.869) (-2.110) (0.524) (1.973) 
Diff in no. of blockholders 0.149 0.010 -11.079 -39.186** 
 (0.101) (0.007) (-0.656) (-1.981) 
Tender offer 7.890 15.795 147.057 529.452** 
 (0.466) (1.062) (0.660) (2.088) 
Relative deal size 30.386 16.010 -244.573 -973.458** 
 (0.946) (0.559) (-0.575) (-2.011) 
Cross-industry 13.591 5.101 -119.368 -465.777** 
 (0.856) (0.358) (-0.579) (-1.979) 
Inverse mills ratio -8.521 -1.528 219.370 829.795** 
 (-0.305) (-0.062) (0.601) (2.011) 
Constant -10.343 -29.824 -1161.807 -3748.822* 
 (-0.332) (-1.084) (-0.579) (-1.958) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1307 693 303 311 
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.435 0.142 0.128 
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Table 9: Robustness tests using alternative measures of PIN 
This table reports the regressions using alternative measures of PIN. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Industry-year adjusted PIN             
Dependent variable Payment method Acquirer CAR Target CAR 
  Cashper  Choice Cash Stock Cash Stock 
Acquirer industry-year adjusted PIN 474.656*** 2.124*** 36.435*** -10.184 -132.620*** -125.840** 
 (2.978) (3.006) (3.609) (-0.372) (-5.039) (-2.221) 
Target industry-year adjusted PIN -483.593*** -2.075*** -27.639*** 19.486 129.006*** 116.535** 
 (-3.640) (-3.065) (-2.822) (0.747) (5.042) (1.987) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1724 1724 1062 337 1062 337 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.122 0.188 0.101 0.195 0.407 0.126 
Panel B: EKO PIN             
Dependent variable Payment method Acquirer CAR Target CAR 
  Cashper  Choice Cash Stock Cash Stock 
Acquirer EKO PIN 481.387*** 2.372*** 65.138*** -49.460 -57.103* -189.061 
 (18.246) (3.057) (4.190) (-0.120) (-1.883) (-0.286) 
Target EKO PIN -544.196*** -3.004*** -74.443*** 50.687 63.481* 211.458 
 (-23.929) (-4.494) (-4.039) (0.097) (1.874) (0.252) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1613 1613 989 318 989 318 





Table 10: PIN and Method of Payment: The Role of Corporate Governance and 
Reg FD 
This table reports the regressions of the method of payment in M&As on acquirer and target 
PIN conditional upon corporate governance and Reg FD. The estimations are based on a two-
boundary Tobit model to reflect the lower and upper bound on the dependent variable (Cashper). 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. T-statistics are calculated from robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 Dep. = Cashper Dep. = Cashper 
 (1) (2) 
Acquirer PIN 1746.703*** 789.435*** 
 (41.920) (28.548) 
Target PIN -925.154*** -358.143*** 
 (-28.590) (-14.993) 
Acquirer PIN x G-Index -138.303***  
 (-34.700)  
Target PIN x G-Index 38.552***  
 (12.621)  
G-Index 11.496***  
 (18.169)  
Acquirer PIN x Reg FD  -1101.530*** 
  (-26.159) 
Target PIN x Reg FD  -14.861 
  (-0.466) 
Reg FD  327.341*** 
  (54.261) 
Firm size -22.780*** -15.148*** 
 (-29.548) (-22.942) 
Asset tangibility 55.509*** 65.666*** 
 (7.658) (10.465) 
Dividend payer 29.671*** 36.837*** 
 (5.333) (8.028) 
Tobin’s q -30.801*** -29.917*** 
 (-19.057) (-22.136) 
Leverage -46.449*** -67.840*** 
 (-2.848) (-5.188) 
Illiquidity 371.542*** 50.119*** 
 (8.529) (10.805) 
Stock price run-up -35.098*** -40.631*** 
 (-12.096) (-19.544) 
Target Tobin's q 16.655*** 13.364*** 
 (9.813) (9.819) 
Target Leverage -83.227*** -74.237*** 
 (-6.457) (-6.488) 
Target Illiquidity 5.837 -1.206 
 (1.258) (-0.881) 
Target stock price run-up 14.997*** 19.276*** 
 (7.053) (11.309) 
Diff in forecast dispersion -4.556** 12.917*** 
 (-1.980) (8.137) 
Diff in forecast error 23.526*** -5.448 
 (2.831) (-0.909) 
Diff in abnormal accruals 78.896*** 1.326 
 (9.799) (0.220) 
Diff in idiosyncratic vol. 3852.290*** 4600.055*** 
 (17.676) (30.435) 
Diff in no. of blockholders -0.377 -3.212*** 
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 (-0.587) (-8.964) 
Tender offer 114.797*** 130.236*** 
 (20.200) (29.972) 
Relative deal size -270.635*** -234.935*** 
 (-50.831) (-53.102) 
Cross-industry -101.016*** -97.538*** 
 (-20.752) (-25.899) 
Intercept 1 878.493*** 967.558*** 
 (135.657) (181.249) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
N 950 1724 
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.289 
 
